North Korea faces an uncertain and bleak future. Under the military-first politics instituted by the late Kim Jong-il, limited resources have been devoted to its nuclear program leading to a chronic under-investment in areas crucial for national development such as economy, culture, and the environment. The current survival strategy of North Korea based upon military-first politics and nuclear weapons is unsustainable in the long run. In what way can North Korea then pursue reforms and opening without provoking a sudden collapse of the state?
In answering this crucial question, Future of North Korea 2032: Coevolutionary Strategy for Advancement maps out the post-Kim Jong-il era by proposing that North Korea can only sustain the regime through giving up the military-first politics and changing its system of governance. Specifically, this strategy emphasizes that North Korea should ¡°coevolve¡± with its surrounding countries whose cooperation is indispensible in the process of transforming North Korea.
CHAPTER 1
Path to an Advanced North Korea by 2032: Building a Complex Networked State_ Young-Sun Ha
CHAPTER 2
North Korea as a Transformer: From a Fortress State to an Amphibious State_ Seongji Woo
CHAPTER 3
Coevolution Strategy for North Korea: Diplomacy_ Chaesung Chun
CHAPTER 4
Getting Out of the Military-First Dilemmas: In Search of North Korea¡¯s Coevolution Military Strategy_ Jihwan Hwang
CHAPTER 5
A Strategy for the Advancement of the North Korean Economy_ Dongho Jo
CHAPTER 6
A Strategy for the Coevolution of North Korean Human Rights_ Soo-Am Kim
Both past and current South Korean governments have shared a common policy goal toward North Korea to seek change. Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun adopted engagement approaches, whereas the Lee Myung-bak administration opted for a more principled engagement strategy. The engagement policies of the Kim and Roh administrations believed that Pyongyang could be made to change through unconditional support while the principled engagement policy under the Lee administration expected that strong pressure would force the regime to change. Neither policy though considered that change would also have to come from Seoul. As all these policies were nothing more than hopeful efforts, no government could escape from criticism over the ineffective results from these different approaches. In fact any real shift in policy should come from within and not as a result of external forces.
It is now clear how we should deal with Pyongyang. South Korea should pursue a strategy where North Korea chooses to implement change from within. The adoption of a ¡°coevolutionary approach¡± is essential, utilizing a policy that pursues changes from South Korea and neighboring countries in the region in accordance with changes from North Korea to encourage its momentum to reform.